Tragedy Postponed: The Little Venus Incident

Last July a forest fire burned over a wildland fire use module (Whoofoo crew) at the Little Venus Fire on the Shoshone National Forest. All 10 firefighters survived by deploying fire shelters: reflective, metallic, one-man tents.

Burnovers and shelter deployments are a big deal. Burnovers kill firefighters. Shelters are a last-ditch attempt to save lives, when all other measures have failed. Neither the firefighting community nor the greater community at large desire burnovers or shelter deployments, and when they happen, there are investigations.

The Little Venus Incident was investigated, and chief among the findings is the Little Venus Fire Shelter Deployment Peer Review Report, issued August 24, 2006. The entire Report is available (here) (49 pages with pictures, 1,326 KB). It is an exceptional document, very well-written and researched, and based on personal interviews of those involved.

From the Executive Summary:

On July 18, 2006, 10 individuals assigned to the Little Venus Fire on the Shoshone NF as part of a fire use module were entrapped by the fire and deployed fire shelters. No significant injuries were sustained, no personnel were hospitalized and all personnel were safely evacuated from the fire. …

The US Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Regional Office initiated a review of the circumstances surrounding the deployment. A Review Team consisting of Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management personnel was formed and reported to the Shoshone NF Supervisor’s Office in Cody, Wyoming, on July 19, 2006. …

The Review Team was thorough and frank. In this post we examine the Little Venus Incident, as well-described in the Report and interpreted through our own experience, and it’s relevance to fire, forests, and the future of both.

A Tragedy of Errors

What the Review Team found was a cascade of human errors that nearly killed 12 people and a packtrain of mules.

The incident in question occurred because a Whoofoo team walked up a steep-sided canyon while the Whoofoo fire was coming down it. They had no radio communication, because the ridgetop radio repeater system was not functioning. They left the trailhead in the afternoon as the wind was picking up, and marched up into the fiery unknown with a muletrain.

Their civilian packers, a man and his 14-year-old son, and ten mules went up the trail ahead of them. Neither packer had any fire gear. When they reached the fire front, the boy turned and rode his mule at a gallop back down the trail. One mule followed him. The adult packer grabbed the leads of others and rode down after.

The fire was bearing down on the Whoofoo team, and so was the boy, who scattered the team off the trail as he galloped through cursing and screaming, trailing a mule. One member of the team had already hightailed down the trail, found a shelter site, and deployed her fire shelter. The others were regrouping when the other packer and the other eight mules came stampeding right out of the flames.

The mules were entangled in their leads, and the nine remaining firefighters helped cut them free. This five-minute melee was later referred to as “the rodeo”. Then the elder packer took off down the trail with the mules, and the nine firefighters deployed their fire shelters.

There were only eight working shelters (one was ripped at the seams). The unlucky firefighter used it as a tarp. After a short heat pulse, the team redeployed at another spot, joined tents and improved the situation for the ninth man. Four of the shelters were “new generation”, the others were the old kind.

The group of nine firefighters huddled in their shelters for an hour as the fire burned all around them and four “heat pulses” seared through. The tenth firefighter had deployed down the canyon, and she experienced five heat pulses over the course of an hour and a half.

Two hours after she first headed back down the trail, the isolated firefighter finally made radio contact with a helicopter. She believed that the other crew members were dead. A half hour later the other nine made radio contact, and fifteen minutes after that they joined up with the tenth firefighter.

The heli-base had been alerted by another firefighter on another part of the fire, who had heard the radio calls from the crew before they deployed and had driven his truck to the base to inform the fire managers (the comm system was down).

Two helicopters were sent aloft in strong winds. Neither dropped any water or rescued the crew, but they did eventually make radio contact.

The ten firefighters all walked out, dodging falling fresh snags, and discovered that the packers and mules had outrun the fire and were safe at the trailhead. The firefighters were given first aid for minor burns and oxygen for their smoke-seared lungs, but no one was hospitalized. Then the crew drove back to their motel.

 

Technical Details

From the Report:

The Little Venus Fire was located in the Washakie Wilderness, an area authorized for wildland fire use (WFU) in the Forest Plan. As a naturally ignited wildland fire in an area approved for WFU, the fire became a candidate. Forest staff initiated the Wildland Fire Implementation Plan (WFIP) (on file at Shoshone NF Forest Supervisor’s Office) Stage I on June 23. The fire met criteria for management as a WFU and the decision was made to implement it as such by the Forest Supervisor. This instance marks the first wildland fire use event of this complexity on the Shoshone NF.

Planning and implementation procedures for wildland fire use events are described in the “Wildland Fire Use: Implementation Procedures Reference Guide” (BLM/BIA/FWS/NPS/USFS 2005) which states: “Wildland fire use, based on the Federal Fire Policy direction, is a direct component of wildland fire management. It is a management action equal to wildfire suppression and thus, constitutes an emergency action. It receives consideration, management attention, and management policies equal to wildfire suppression, except for specific differences related to ignition source and management action success….”

The Shoshone NF had no experience with a major Whoofoo. They were attempting to comply with national policy directives that encourage Whoofoos. Just doing their jobs, they declared one with all the bureaucratic red tape involved, and handed it off to a Type 1 Fire Use Management Team (FUMT1). FUMTs are made up of FUMs (fire use modules). We refer to FUM’s as Whoofoo crews.

The Unaweep Whoofoo crew (FUM) is normally a 7 person team, managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in Grand Junction, Colorado. At the time of the Little Venus Fire there were eight team members, including two trainees from the Payette NF, one from the White River NF, a BLM trainee from the Boise Smoke Jumper base, and four other BLM employees. Two Shoshone NF firefighters joined the Whoofoo crew on the Little Venus Fire, bringing the total to ten.

All were trained and experienced firefighters, which was a big factor in saving their own lives.

The Little Venus Fire had been ignited by lightning on June 19, 2006. The fire was not discovered until June 23. Initially, the fire was situated on a ridge north of Venus Creek. This area was dominated by grass, sagebrush and heavy dead and down woody forest fuels. In this area, there is a large amount of trees dead or dying from past insect and disease. An estimated 50% or more of the Engelmann spruce, lodge pole pine, and whitebark pine trees were dead throughout the area…

A national Fire Use Management Team (FUMT) was assigned to the fire in late June and prepared a long term strategic implementation plan.

The Unaweep FUM was the second Whoofoo crew on the Little Venus Fire. They were replacing the Black Hills FUM.

Due to the growth of the fire, management on the Little Venus was becoming more complex. By July 17, resources assigned to this fire included one type 1 and one type 2 helicopters (both helicopters were restricted use ships, meaning they are not certified or equipped to transport firefighters), an interagency hotshot crew, a type two hand crew, a FUM1, an Operations Section Chief, a trainee Division Supervisor and a few miscellaneous overhead. Also, another fire use module, the Black Hills FUM, had been assigned to Little Venus for the past two weeks. Black Hills was briefed that they would transition and be replaced by Unaweep on July 18. On July 17, the complexity of Little Venus was well within the capabilities of a FUM1 and comparable to a moderately complex Type 3 suppression incident.

What is Whoofoo duty like? The Report was frank:

On July 16, Unaweep was ordered for the Little Venus WFU. This assignment had all the ingredients of most Fire Use Modules’ favorite type of assignment: The firefighters would be in timber country, in a wilderness area, in a cooler high elevation climate and the fire’s location was fairly remote. They looked forward to a two week assignment in the rugged Washakie Wilderness area.

Whoofoo duty is not exactly the same as a Boy Scout camping trip. The campers are older and there are girls along, too. And although all the campers are experienced wildland firefighters, they don’t do a lot of that, which is nice for them.

It is difficult to figure out exactly what it is that they do, or are supposed to do:

One of the purposes of Fire Use Modules is to support wildland fire use implementation for federal wildland fire management agencies. On wildland fire use assignments, module members carry out ontheground activities that range from monitoring fire behavior and weather to limited firefighting to check a fire’s intensity or spread in certain areas. Modules frequently serve as field observers supplying maps and fire intelligence to fire behavior and resource unit personnel. On suppression incidents, modules may serve as fire crews building line and conducting complex burnout operations.

Nationwide, fire use modules are valued for their high level of fire behavior monitoring expertise, and known for their ability to safely operate with little logistical support in very remote wilderness areas.

Apparently Whoofoo crews implement monitoring, although how they do that without communications is inexplicable. They allegedly have a lot of expertise at predicting fire behavior, too. Except in this case, apparently.

Fire behavior was under predicted by the fire behavior analyst for the day of July 18, 2006, and the fire spread surprised most of the people involved. Current fire behavior models do not accurately reflect rate of spread in standing dead timber or in conditions of high winds and high probability of ignition which results in spread by spotting.

Apparently their models are funky, and they cannot predict fire behavior to save their lives, so to speak.

Whoofoo crews are apparently roving bands of experienced firefighters who watch forest fires burn and use their skills to stay out of the way, except when they don’t. Whoofooing is an extreme sport, like parasailing or bungee jumping, apparently.

 

The Bureaucratic Reaction

The only bureaucratic reaction to Whoofoos, that we know of, is the Audit, (the Audit is the Report on Large Fire Suppression Costs we have referred to in previous posts). The Audit recommends more Whoofoos:

As of June 2006, FS had only 7 fire-use management teams compared to 55 incident management teams. Similarly, FS has relatively few fire-use managers. Although the FS estimates that 300 such managers are needed to select WFU for all eligible ignitions, the agency currently has only 83 qualified staff. As a result, FS risks not having adequate staff to affect WFU when appropriate. FS staff in Regions 1 and 4, which have large wilderness areas designated for WFU, said that in some years they had come close to not having sufficient fire-use management teams available while staff in Region 3 informed us that they missed one opportunity to use WFU in the 2003 fire season because a team was not available.

Fire staff in each of these regions agreed that more fire-use management teams will be needed to support planned WFU expansion projects. FS staff at a national forest in Region 1, for example, said that they are drafting a proposal that would allow WFU on an additional 1.2 million acres. Region 4 staff indicated that they had increased WFU acreage by 55 percent in one wilderness area and had plans for further WFU expansion. However, if fireuse management teams are not available when fires start in these areas, the fires will have to be suppressed even though they may be suitable for WFU. …

FS’ expansion of WFU, together with the complexity of managing fire use in the growing WUI, will require an increased number of fire-use management teams in order to meet its objective of reducing hazardous fuels. …

The restrictive policies and lack of qualified personnel contribute to the overwhelming predisposition for FS to suppress fires rather than let them burn as WFU. Of almost 80,000 natural ignitions that occurred on FS land from 1998 through 2005, only about 1,500, or 2 percent, were allowed to burn as WFU.

We wholeheartedly disagree. Whoofoos are nothing but trouble. They do not prevent catastrophic fires; they are them.

 

Lessons Learned from the Little Venus Incident

The Report presents a long list of lessons the firefighters learned for themselves from this incident. Most are fairly basic:

• Will pay more attention to Red Flag warnings.
• Will be more cautious hiking into a fire late in the day.
• Will not assume communications are adequate.
• Will establish communications with aircraft so they can also serve as our look outs and give us a heads up on developing fire activity.
• Will be more mindful of conditions? maintain situational awareness and attention to planning potential safety zones.
• Will more thoroughly analyze fuels and topography, escape routes, and the overall general situation.
• Will be especially mindful of potential safety zones in thick timber conditions.
• Will stand up and not allow a young boy to enter the fire area.

Some are reminiscent of prior situations when firefighters were injured or killed:

• Will request thorough briefings before accepting an assignments including knowing fire danger conditions are covered and potential for extreme fire behavior is discussed.
• Will call ICP [Incident Command Post] periodically for information updates.
• Will resolve confusing issues over chain of command and reporting protocol.
• Will evaluate the impacts of delays to safety and mission accomplishments.
• Hiking crews in to a fire should be considered an operational assignment. That means it is planned and implemented accordingly including map, routes, drop off times, pick up times, oversight and monitoring by operations, etc.

Some of the firefighter recommendations deal directly with Whoofoos:

• Agencies need to teach operational overhead and suppression crews the mission and role of FUMs.
• FUMs need operational support, especially under extreme conditions.
• Fire use is more dangerous than firefighting, and needs to be treated accordingly.
• Agencies need to train FUMs and WFU Teams to ensure that all incidents have clear objectives, full and complete overhead, full briefings, complete information sharing and full implementation of LCES [lookouts, communications, escape routes and safety zones, part of standard fire orders].
• Agencies must also require all the same rules of engagement be enforced on fire use as they are on suppression.
• Fire use needs same attention as suppression and must not allow cost containment objectives to take priority over firefighter safety. The focus on keeping costs low interfered with mitigating key safety concerns and this is unacceptable. Agencies must STOP fostering a culture of doing more with less.
• Fire Use organizations should require that the operations section chief be on the fire line.
• Fire Use organizations need to develop contingency plans for all operations including contingencies for a safety during a blowup.

We want to emphasize one of those recommendations, the one the firefighters themselves emphasized:

The focus on keeping costs low interfered with mitigating key safety concerns and this is unacceptable. Agencies must STOP fostering a culture of doing more with less.

 

Legal/Criminal Implications

There were many similarities between the Little Venus Incident and the Thirtymile Fire of 2001. Both involved Federal fire crews entrapped in narrow canyons during a blowup. Both were shelter deployment situations.

There were also differences. One is that at the Thirtymile Fire four firefighters died (of asphyxia from inhaling superheated gases), whereas no one died on the Little Venus Fire.

Another is that the Incident Commander on the Thirtymile Fire is being charged with involuntary manslaughter by the US Dept. of Justice.

To our knowledge the IC and other fire managers of the Little Venus Fire have not yet been charged with criminal negligence or any other Federal crimes. However, we advise them to lawyer-up, if they haven’t already.

Ironically, the Federal charges brought against the Thirtymile Fire IC are based on a lengthy affidavit by prepared by John Parker, a special agent with the Department of Agriculture-Office of Inspector General (USDA-OIG).

And the USDA-OIG also produced the Audit calling for a 10-fold increase in Whoofoos! How’s that for entrapment of firefighters?

Maybe the USDA-OIG should investigate themselves, call for Federal indictments, and then turn themselves in for prosecution, conviction, and incarceration in their favorite Federal Penitentiary.

 

Tragedy Postponed, Then Realized

The Little Venus Deployment Report does not name the firefighters involved, save one. The report does say that there were two Whoofoo trainees from the Payette NF on the 10-man module. One of those two, a female, got separated from the others during the burnover. All alone for nearly two hours, she crouched in her shelter while five heat shockwaves blew over her exposed and windy spot.

She was out of radio contact. They all were. She thought they were all dead, and that she was going to die, too.

Imagine the horror.

Monica Zajanc was one of the two Payette trainees on the Whoofoo crew, so there is at least a 50-50 chance she was the one alone in the burnover. A month later Monica was killed in a helicopter crash, a rather bizarre one where the chopper just seemed to nosedive into the ground in front of many witnesses. We have not seen the official investigation report, but it hardly matters in some respects.

It is almost as if God showed Monica the Pearly Gates, and then a month later took her on into Heaven. She was 27.

We wrote a few memorial posts last summer to fallen firefighters. Among those, we reported the helicopter crash that killed Monica and three others. More visitors found this blog by googling *Monica Zajanc* than any other fallen firefighter we mentioned; indeed, more than all the rest put together. We got letters from her friends. We still get many hits on that post.

Evidently Monica Zajanc was very much loved by a great many people, and she is still deeply mourned.

There is some lesson in all this that we can’t quite grasp yet.

So we leave it to you.